We wish to instantiate conditions (S1.3) and (S1.4), which predict respec-5 tively when donation and its suppression will receive positive selection, for 6 the case where individuals are always only paired with other donators (i.e.
E(G)(1 − E(G )) E(G)(1 − E(G)
which case E(G) = E(G ) and E(X) = E(X ), so Hamilton's rule with costs 56 and benefits in terms of direct payoffs from interactions is recovered from 57 conditions (S1.5) and (S1.6). The crucial point to note is that the genetic 58 association between actors at the donation locus and the modifier locus can 59 be different, according to the means by which this association is generated.
portant for the evolution of social behaviours. For inter-specific interactions 62 a key implication, as noted by Foster (2009) , is that inter-specific donation 63 that arises by matching at the donation locus will thus be vulnerable to 64 donation-suppressing modifiers. This is because, in different species, genetic 65 similarity at the donation locus will not guarantee genetic similarity at other 66 loci. 
